We utilize the dynamics involved in the imaging of a fingerprint on a touch-based fingerprint reader, such as perspiration, changes in skin color (blanching), and skin distortion, to differentiate real fingers from spoof (fake) fingers. Specifically, we utilize a deep learning-based architecture (CNN-LSTM) trained end-to-end using sequences of minutiae-centered local patches extracted from ten color frames captured on a COTS fingerprint reader. A timedistributed CNN (MobileNet-v1) extracts spatial features from each local patch, while a bi-directional LSTM layer learns the temporal relationship between the patches in the sequence. Experimental results on a database of 26, 650 live frames from 685 subjects (1, 333 unique fingers), and 32, 910 spoof frames of 7 spoof materials (with 14 variants) shows the superiority of the proposed approach in both known-material and cross-material (generalization) scenarios. For instance, the proposed approach improves the state-of-the-art cross-material performance from TDR of 81.65% to 86.20% @ FDR = 0.2%.
Introduction
Fingerprint recognition technology is now widely adopted across the globe for a plethora of applications, including international border crossing 1 , forensics 2 , unlocking smartphones 3 , and national ID 4 programs. However, one of the most critical premise for this wide acceptance is that users have trust in the security of a fingerprint recognition system, namely protection of enrolled fingerprints (templates) and detection of fingerprint spoofs [17] . In this paper, we focus on fingerprint spoof detection.
Fingerprint spoof attacks 5 refer to finger-like artifacts Figure 1 . A sequence of ten color frames are captured by a SilkID SLK20R fingerprint reader in quick succession (8 fps). The first, fifth, and tenth frames from a live (a) -(c), and spoof (tan pigmented third degree) (d) -(f) finger are shown here. Unlike spoofs, in the case of live fingers, appearance of sweat near pores (highlighted in yellow boxes) and changes in skin color (pinkish red to pale yellow) along the frames can be observed.
with an accurate imitation of one's fingerprint fabricated for the purpose of stealing their identity. Techniques ranging from simple molding and casting to sophisticated 3D printing have been utilized to create spoofs with high fidelity [18, 3, 8] . Various readily available and inexpensive materials (e.g. gelatin, wood glue, play doh) can be used to create spoofs that are capable of circumventing a fingerprint recognition system. For instance, in March 2018, a gang in Rajasthan (India) bypassed the biometric attendance systems, using wood glue spoofs casted in wax molds, to provide proxies for police academy entrance exams 6 .
attacks as the "presentation to the biometric data capture subsystem with the goal of interfering with the operation of the biometric system". Other forms of PAs include use of altered fingers and cadavers. 6 https://www.medianama.com/2018/03/223-clonedthumb-prints-used-to-spoof-biometrics-and-allowproxies-to-answer-online-rajasthan-police-exam/ With the goal to detect such spoof attacks, various hardware and software-based spoof detection approaches have been proposed in literature [17] . The hardware-based approaches typically utilize specialized sensors to detect the signs of vitality (blood flow, heartbeat, etc.) and/or sensing technologies for sub-dermal imaging [14, 29, 7, 19] . On the other hand, software-based approaches extract salient cues, related to anatomical (pores) [25] and texture-based features [30] , from the captured fingerprint image(s). Chugh et al. [6] utilized minutiae-based local patches to train deep neural networks that achieves state-of-the-art spoof detection performance. Gonzalez-Soler et al. [10] proposed fusion of feature encodings of dense-SIFT features for robust spoof detection.
Software-based approaches can be further classified into static and dynamic approaches based on the input. A static approach extracts discriminative spatial features from a single fingerprint image, while a dynamic approach utilizes an image sequence to extract spatial and/or temporal features for spoof detection. For a comprehensive review on the existing static approaches, readers are referred to [17, 9] .
In the case of dynamic approaches, published studies utilize temporal analysis to capture the physiological features, such as perspiration [22, 16] , blood flow [31, 14] , skin distortion [1] , and color change [31, 23] . Table 1 summarizes the dynamic approaches for fingerprint spoof detection reported in the literature. Some of the limitations of these studies include long capture time (2-5 seconds), expensive hardware, and/or small number of frames in the sequence. Moreover, it is likely that some live fingers may not exhibit any of these dynamic phenomenons to separate them from spoofs. For instance, some dry fingers may not exhibit signs of perspiration during the finger presentation or a spoof may produce similar distortion characteristics as that of some live fingers.
We posit that automatic learning, as opposed to handengineering, of the dynamic features involved in the presentation of a finger can provide more robust and highly discriminating cues to distinguish live from spoofs. In this study, we propose to use a CNN-LSTM architecture to learn the spatio-temporal features across different frames in a sequence. We utilize a sequence of minutiae-centered local patches extracted from ten colored frames captured by a COTS fingerprint reader, SilkID SLK20R 7 , at 8 fps to train the network in an end-to-end manner. The use of minutiaebased local patches has been shown to achieve state-of-theart spoof detection performance compared to randomly selected local patches in static images [5] . Additionally, using minutiae-based local patches provides a large amount of training data, 71, 530 minutiae-based patch sequences, compared to 5, 956 whole-frame sequences.
The main contributions of this study are:
• Utilized sequences of minutiae-based local patches to train a CNN-LSTM architecture with the goal of learning discriminative spatio-temporal features for fingerprint spoof detection. The local patches are extracted from a sequence of ten colored frames captured in quick succession (8 fps) using a COTS fingerprint reader, SilkID SLK20R.
• Experimental results on a dataset of 26, 650 live captures from 685 subjects (1333 unique fingers) and 32, 930 spoof frames from 7 spoof materials (with 14 variants) shows that the proposed approach is able to improve the state-of-the-art cross-material performance from TDR of 81.65% to 86.20% @ FDR = 0.2%.
Proposed Approach
The proposed approach consists of: (a) detecting minutiae from each of the frames and selecting the frame with the highest number of minutiae as the reference frame, (b) preprocessing the sequence of frames to convert them from Bayer pattern grayscale images to RGB images, (c) extracting local patches (192 × 192) from all ten frames based on the location of detected minutiae in the reference frame, and (c) end-to-end training of a CNN-LSTM architecture using the sequences of minutiae-centered patches extracted from the ten frames. While a time-distributed CNN network (MobileNet-v1) with shared weights extracts deep features from the local patches, a bidirectional LSTM layer is utilized to learn the temporal relationship between the features extracted from the sequence. An overview of the proposed approach is presented in Figure 4 .
Minutia Detection
When a finger (or spoof) is presented to the SilkID SLK20R fingerprint reader, it captures a sequence of ten color frames, F = {f 1 , f 2 , ..., f 10 }, at 8 frames per second 8 (fps) and a resolution of 1000 ppi. While the complete sensing region (h × w) in a SilkID fingerprint reader is 800 × 600 pixels, each of the ten colored frames are captured from a smaller central region of 630 × 390 pixels to ensure the fast frame rate of 8 fps. The starting and ending frames in the sequence may have little or no friction ridge details if the finger is not yet completely placed or quickly removed from the reader, respectively. Therefore, we extract minutiae information from all of the ten frames using the algorithm proposed by Cao et al. [4] . Since the minutiae detector proposed in [4] is optimized for 500 ppi fingerprint images, all frames are resized before extracting the minutiae. The frame with the maximum number of detected minutiae is selected as the reference frame (f ref ) and the corresponding minutiae set as the reference minutiae set (M ref ).
Pre-processing
A digital sensor, containing a large array of photosensitive sites (pixels), is typically used in conjunction with a color filter array to permit only particular colors of light 8 It takes an average of 1.25 seconds to capture a sequence of ten frames. at each pixel. SilkID fingerprint reader employs one of the most common filter arrays, called as Bayer filter array, consisting of alternating rows of red-green (RG) and greenblue (GB) filters. Bayer demosaicing [15] (debayering) is the process of converting a bayer pattern image to an image with complete RGB color information at each pixel. It utilizes bilinear interpolation technique [28] to estimate the missing pixels in the three color planes as shown in Figure 3 . The original sequence of grayscale Bayer pattern frames (10 × 630 × 390) is converted to RGB colorspace using an OpenCV [2] function, cv2.cvtColor(), with the parameter f lag = cv2.COLOR BAYER BG2RGB. After debayering, the frames have high pixel intensity values in the green channel (see Figure 4 ) as SilkID readers are calibrated with strong gains on green pixels for generating high quality FTIR images. We utilize these raw images for our experiments. For visualization purposes, we reduce the green channel intensity values by a factor of 0.58 and perform histogram equalization on intensity value in the HSV colorspace 9 (see Figures 1 and 2 ).
Local Patch Extraction
For each of the detected minutiae from the reference frame, m i ∈ M ref , we extract a sequence of ten local patches, P i = {p f1 i , p f2 i , ..., p f10 i }, of size 192 × 192, from the ten frames (F ), centered at the minutiae location 10 , i.e. m i = {x i , y i }. This results in a total of k patch sequences, where k is equal to the number of detected minutiae in the reference frame. Chugh et al. [5] reported that for 500 ppi fingerprint images, the minutiae-based patches of size 96 × 96 pixels achieved the best performance compared to patch sizes of 64 × 64 pixels and 128 × 128 pixels. Therefore, for 1000 ppi images in our case, we selected the patch size of 192 × 192 pixels to ensure similar amount of friction ridge area in each patch, as contained in 96 × 96 pixels patch size for 500 ppi fingerprint images.. Each local patch from the reference frame is centered around the minutiae. However, this might not hold true for non-reference frames where the minutiae may shift due to non-linear distortion of human skin and non-rigid spoof materials. We hypothesize that the proposed approach can utilize the differences in the non-linear shift along the sequences of local patches as a salient cue to distinguish between live and spoof presentations. MobileNet-v1 [12] etc., have been shown to achieve stateof-the-art performance for many vision-based tasks, including fingerprint spoof detection [20, 5] . Unlike traditional approaches where spatial filters are hand-engineered, CNNs can automatically learn salient features from the given image databases. However, as CNNs are feed-forward networks, they are not well-suited to capture the temporal dynamics involved in a sequence of images. On the other hand, a Recurrent Neural Network (RNN) architecture with feedback connections can process a sequence of data to learn the temporal features.
Network Architecture
With the goal of learning highly discriminative and generalizable spatio-temporal features for fingerprint spoof detection, we utilize a joint CNN-RNN architecture that can extract deep spatial features from each frame, and learn the temporal relationship across the sequence. One of the most popular RNN architectures is Long Short-Term Memory [11] that can learn long range dependencies from the input sequences. The proposed network architecture utilizes a time-distributed MobileNet-v1 CNN architecture followed by a Bi-directional LSTM layer 11 and a 2-unit softmax layer for the binary classification problem i.e. live vs. spoof. See Figure 4 .
MobileNet-v1 is a low-latency network with only 4.24M trainable parameters compared to other networks, such as Inception-v3 (23.2M) and VGG (138M), which achieve comparable performance in large-scale vision tasks [24] . In low resource requirements such as smartphones and embedded devices, MobileNet-v1 is well-suited for real-time spoof detection. Most importantly, it has been shown to achieve state-of-the-art performance for fingerprint spoof detection [6] on publicly available datasets [9] . It takes an input image of size 224 × 224 × 3, and outputs a 1024dimensional feature vector (bottleneck layer). We resize the local patches from 192 × 192 to 224 × 224 as required by the MobileNet-v1 input. For the purposes of processing a sequence of images, we utilize a Keras' TimeDistributed wrapper to utilize the MobileNet-v1 architecture as a feature extractor with shared parameters across different frames (time-steps) in the sequence.
Implementation Details
The network architecture is designed in the Keras framework 12 and trained from scratch on a Nvidia GTX 1080Ti GPU. We utilize the MobileNet-v1 architecture without its last layer wrapped in a Time-Distributed layer. The Bi-directional LSTM layer contains 256 units and has a dropout rate of 0.25. We utilize Adam [13] optimizer with a learning rate of 0.001 and a binary cross entropy loss func-12 https://keras.io/ tion. The network is trained end-to-end with a batch size of 4. The network is trained for 80 epochs with early-stopping and patience = 20.
Experimental Results

Database
In this study, we utilize a large-scale fingerprint database of 26, 650 live frames from 685 subjects, and 32, 930 spoof frames of 7 materials (14 variants) collected on SilkID SLK20R fingerprint reader. This database is constructed by combining fingerprint images collected from two sources. First, as part of the IARPA ODIN program [21] , a largescale Government Controlled Test (GCT-3) was conducted at Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory (JHUAPL) facility in Nov. 2019, where a total of 685 subjects with diverse demographics (in terms of age, profession, gender, and race) were recruited to present their real (live) as well as spoof biometric data (fingerprint, face, and iris). The spoof fingerprints were fabricated using 5 different spoof materials (11 variants) and a variety of fabrication techniques, including use of dental and 3D printed molds. For a balanced live and spoof data distribution, we utilize only right thumb and right index fingerprint images for the live data. Second, we collected spoof data in a lab setting 13 using dental molds casted with three different materials, namely ecoflex (with flesh tone pigment), crayola model magic (red and white colors), and dragon skin (with Table 4 . Performance comparison (TDR (%) @ FDR = 0.2%) between the proposed approach and the state-of-the-art [6] for three crossmaterial scenarios, where the spoof materials used in testing are unknown during training.
Baselines
Proposed Approach 
Results
To demonstrate the robustness of our proposed approach, we evaluate it under two different settings, namely Known-Material and Cross-Material scenarios.
Known-Material Scenario
In this scenario, the same set of spoof materials are included in the train and test sets. To evaluate this, we utilize fivefold cross validation splitting the live and spoof datasets in 80/20 splits for training and testing with no subject overlap. In each of the five folds, there are 21, 320 live and 26, 400 spoof frames in training and rest in testing. Table 3 presents the results achieved by the proposed approach on knownmaterials compared to a state-of-the-art approach [6] that utilizes minutiae-based local patches from static grayscale images. The proposed approach improves the spoof detection performance from TDR of 99.11% to 99.25% @ FDR = 0.2%.
Cross-Material Scenario
In this scenario, the spoof materials used in the test set are unknown during training. We simulate this scenario by adopting a leave-one-out protocol, where one material (including all its variants) is removed from training, and it used for evaluating the trained model. It is a more challenging and practical setting as it evaluates the generalizability of a spoof detector against spoofs that are never seen during training. For instance, in one of the cross-material experiments, we exclude all of the third degree spoofs (pigmented, tan, beige powder, and medium) from training, and use them for testing. The live data is randomly divided in a 80/20 split, with no subject overlap, for training and testing, respectively. The proposed approach improves the crossmaterial spoof detection performance from TDR of 81.65% to 86.20% @ FDR = 0.2%. Table 4 presents the spoof detection performance achieved by the proposed approach, on three cross-material experiments, compared to a state-ofthe-art approach.
Processing Times
The proposed network architecture takes around 4 − 6 hours to converge when trained with sequences of whole frames, and 24−30 hours with sequences of minutiae-based local patches, using a Nvidia GTX 1080Ti GPU. An average of 11 (13) sequences of minutiae-based local patches are extracted from the live (spoof) frames. The average classification time for a single presentation, including preprocessing, minutiae-detection, patch extraction, and sequence generation and inference, on a Nvidia GTX 1080 Ti GPU is 58ms for full frame-based sequences, and 393ms for minutiaebased patch sequences.
Conclusions
A robust and generalizable spoof detector is pivotal in the security and privacy of fingerprint recognition systems against unknown spoof attacks. In this study, we utilized a sequence of local patches centered at detected minutiae from ten color frames captured at 8 fps as the finger is presented on the sensor. We posit that the dynamics involved in the presentation of a finger, such as skin blanching, distortion, and perspiration, provide discriminating cues to distinguish live from spoofs. We utilize a jointly learned CNN-LSTM model to learn the spatio-temporal dynamics across different frames in the sequence. The proposed approach improves the spoof detection performance from TDR of 99.11% to 99.25% @ FDR = 0.2% in known-material scenarios, and from TDR of 81.65% to 86.20% @ FDR = 0.2% in cross-material scenarios. In future, we will explore the use of live sequences to learn a one-class classifier for generalized fingerprint spoof detection.
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